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Coordination or Mere Registration?                          
Single-Speaker Permits in Berger v. City of Seattle  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Berger v. City of Seattle,1 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a 
Seattle permit requirement because it violated the protections of the 
First Amendment. At issue was whether the City of Seattle (the 
“City”) could constitutionally require individual street performers to 
obtain a permit in order to perform in the Seattle Center, a multi-use 
public park. The City claimed the ordinance was a valid time, place, 
and manner restriction designed (1) to further the City’s legitimate 
interest in coordination of limited public space, and (2) to reduce 
conflicts both among street performers and between performers and 
the public. However, the Ninth Circuit found the City’s interest in 
coordination to be non-existent, leaving only an unconstitutional 
speech registration system.  
There is currently a circuit split on the issue of whether the First 
Amendment forbids “single-speaker permitting requirements for 
speech in a public forum.”2 The majority of circuits have sided with 
the Ninth Circuit.3 However, this question is not without significant 
controversy. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself was bitterly divided on 
the question. In 2008, a three-judge panel upheld every piece of the 
challenged ordinance;4 but, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
2008 decision en banc and changed course by invalidating nearly the 
entire ordinance.5 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
correctly invalidated the Seattle Center permitting scheme because it 
violated one of the core presumptions of the First Amendment—
 
 1. Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger II), 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 2. Id. at 1039; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text. Compare Santa Monica 
Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing 
how a significant governmental interest for purposes of a prior restraint only arises when “large 
groups of people travel together on streets and sidewalks”), with Hobbs v. County of 
Westchester, 397 F.3d 133, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding single-speaker permitting 
requirement).  
 3. See Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1039. 
 4. Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger I), 512 F.3d 582, 607 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 5. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1029, 1059. 
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namely, that the government does not have a legitimate interest in 
creating a mere registration system without an accompanying interest 
in large group coordination. Additionally, as an alternative holding, 
the Ninth Circuit correctly invalidated the permit scheme because it 
was not narrowly tailored to substantially advance Seattle’s interest in 
reducing conflicts. 
Part II of this Note will describe the context and background of 
the First Amendment with regard to prior restraints and the Supreme 
Court’s approach to permitting systems. Part III will describe the 
facts surrounding Berger v. City of Seattle and the conflicting analysis 
the Ninth Circuit employed in the two opportunities it had to review 
the case. Part IV explains why the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
correctly invalidated the Seattle Center permitting scheme. Part V 
offers a brief summary and conclusion. 
II. CONTEXT & BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment normally does not countenance a prior 
restraint on speech, such as a permitting system where a person 
would be required to inform the government, or worse, ask 
permission, before speaking. However, over time, the Supreme 
Court has allowed the government to create permitting systems 
when certain conditions are satisfied. The Court’s jurisprudence in 
this area is complicated and recent cases have only made the doctrine 
murkier.  
A. Prior Restraints and Permitting Schemes Generally 
There are few principles of First Amendment jurisprudence more 
essential than the presumption against prior restraints. A prominent 
technique of restraint in English law after the invention of the 
printing press had been the licensing of printers—the submission of 
publications to royal officials with the power to give or withhold an 
imprimatur of approval.6 The early U.S. Founders were adamantly 
opposed to such prior restraints, and this opposition was at the 
forefront of their minds when drafting the First Amendment.7 
Despite the general presumption against prior restraints, the 
Supreme Court has made certain careful allowances for various 
 
 6. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). 
 7. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/12/2010  5:44:46 PM 
931 Coordination or Mere Registration? 
 933 
permitting schemes. The Court has attempted to reconcile the 
traditional presumption against prior restraints with the pragmatic 
reality that today’s crowded world requires orderly allocation of 
public spaces. Even so, “precedent is clear that there must be a 
balance between these interests and the effect of the regulations on 
First Amendment rights. In order to overcome the presumption of 
unconstitutionality, any permit scheme has a significant hurdle to 
clear.”8 
B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Permitting Schemes 
While there is still a presumption against prior restraints, the 
Supreme Court has created exceptions to the general rule. The 
Court has articulated a doctrine that describes when, where, and 
how the government may create permitting schemes that do not 
violate the constitution. For many years this doctrine was relatively 
coherent. However, the Court surprised many people in 2002 when 
it decided Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton.9 This case significantly complicated the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area. In the interest of clarity, this Section will 
attempt to summarize and explain the Court’s jurisprudence prior 
to, and in the wake of, Watchtower Bible. 
1. Pre-Watchtower Bible jurisprudence 
In Cox v. New Hampshire,10 the Court (1) upheld a state statute 
requiring a license to conduct a parade or procession on a public 
street and (2) gave power to a licensing board, subject to restrictions, 
to evaluate the applications. The case involved a group of about sixty 
demonstrators who refused to obtain the necessary permit. The 
Court called this type of permit regulation “a traditional exercise of 
control by local government” and stated that the use of such power 
“has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but 
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon 
which they ultimately depend.”11 Later cases have upheld permitting 
requirements that not only cover parades and processions, but also 
 
 8. Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, What Permits Are 
Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 392 (2008) (internal citation omitted). 
 9. 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 10. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
 11. Id. at 574. 
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those that cover theatrical performances and open-air meetings held 
on, or abutting, public streets and ways.12 
Despite the general acceptability of such permitting schemes, the 
Cox Court reasoned that this type of system would not be acceptable 
if it were discriminatory against certain speech or speakers, or if 
licensing boards were given “arbitrary power or an unfettered 
discretion.”13 Later cases have added a requirement that permitting 
statutes contain “narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide 
the licensing authority.”14 Later cases have also explained that 
permitting schemes must also be content-neutral, narrowly tailored 
to advance a significant governmental interest, and must leave open 
ample alternative means for communication.15  
As another limit on the government, the Cox Court explained 
that while the government has the general power to control the use 
of streets for parades and processions, it may not “deny or 
unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities 
for the communication of thought and the discussion of public 
questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.”16 In 
other words, the government may not deny the use of an entire form 
of communication (i.e., a total medium ban),17 and it must respect 
the special protections afforded traditional public forums, like streets, 
parks, and sidewalks.18  
Beyond the mere allowance of such permitting requirements, the 
Court has also generally supported the idea that the government can 
impose permitting fees based upon the size and scope of the event.19 
 
 12. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
 13. Cox, 312 U.S. at 576. For an example of such a system, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 305–07 (1940) (invalidating a statute requiring charitable solicitors to obtain 
approval from a local council that had complete discretion to determine the merits of the 
charitable enterprise).  
 14. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969). 
 15. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
 16. Cox, 312 U.S. at 574. 
 17. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating a total ban 
on the distribution of handbills by door-to-door canvassing); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 
U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating a total ban on the distribution of all handbills on any public 
street, sidewalk, or park). 
 18. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets 
and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”).  
 19. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576–77. 
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These fees are permissible if they are carried out without regard to 
the content of the speech. However, the Court has denied the 
government the right to charge a speaker “a premium in the case of 
a controversial political message delivered before a hostile 
audience.”20 In other words, gauging the fee in consideration of the 
likely reaction to the speech is an impermissibly content-based 
decision, and therefore fails the time, place, and manner test.21 
2. Watchtower Bible considerations 
Additional considerations regarding the validity of a permitting 
scheme arise out of Watchtower Bible.22 In that case, the Court 
invalidated a local ordinance requiring individual canvassers to obtain 
a permit before entering private property to promote a cause.23 Even 
though the permits were apparently issued on a routine basis at no 
charge, a registrant was required to fill out “a fairly detailed” 
registration form and was only “authorized to go upon premises that 
he listed on the registration form.”24 The permit holder was also 
required to carry the permit with him and to display it upon 
request.25  
Under the pre-Watchtower Bible jurisprudence, the Court 
probably would not have invalidated this permitting scheme. After 
all, the government had an interest in the safety and convenience of 
the public—an interest that had previously satisfied the Court. The 
system was content-neutral in that it applied across the board to all 
door-to-door canvassers. It was not a total medium ban—it still 
allowed a means for door-to-door canvassing. The licensing 
 
 20. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136 (1992). 
 21. See id. at 134 (“In order to assess accurately the cost of security for parade 
participants, the administrator ‘must necessarily examine the content of the message that is 
conveyed.’” (quoting Ark. Writer’s Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)) 
(emphasis added)). 
 22. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 
(2002). 
 23. Id. at 154–55. 
 24. Id. Among other things, the registrant was required to divulge his or her name and 
address; a description of the nature and purpose of the cause; the name and address of any 
employer or affiliated organization with a description of the authority of the registrant; the 
length of time the canvasser needed; the specific address of each private residence the registrant 
wished to contact; and any other information that was reasonably necessary. See id. at 155 n.2. 
 25. Id. at 155. 
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authority was constrained by certain objective standards. Finally, the 
permits were issued for no charge to the registrant. 
Why did the Court overwhelmingly invalidate this permit 
scheme? Instead of providing a clear standard of review and the exact 
rationale for its decision in Watchtower Bible, the Court offered 
various justifications for invalidating this registration/permit system. 
First, the Court looked back upon the history of cases involving 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Court noted, for example, that prior cases 
had recognized the critical importance of “hand distribution of 
religious tracts,” and that this type of person-to-person religious 
evangelism shares the general protections of the First Amendment.26 
It recognized the “historical importance of door-to-door canvassing 
and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas.”27 And 
it also noted that the plight of the Jehovah’s Witnesses has not 
always been theirs alone, but that their situation could be analogized 
to other marginalized speakers. In fact, the Court highlighted a prior 
case regarding a law requiring a permit for a labor leader to speak. In 
that case, the Court, after reviewing the many cases involving 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, proclaimed: “‘As a matter of principle a 
requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would 
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free 
speech and free assembly.’”28 
Besides the history of important cases involving Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, the Watchtower Bible Court focused on the permitting 
system itself to determine the balance between the amount of speech 
affected and the level of governmental interest involved. The Court 
was extremely concerned that the registration system was not limited 
to purely commercial canvassing, but extended to religious and even 
political solicitation.29 The Court then articulated three “pernicious 
effect[s] of such a permit requirement.”30 First, registration systems 
 
 26. Id. at 161–62. 
 27. Id. at 162. 
 28. Id. at 163–64 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945)). 
 29. Id. at 165–66 (“The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises 
constitutional concerns. It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First 
Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that in the context of everyday public 
discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors 
and then obtain a permit to do so.”). 
 30. Id. at 166. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/12/2010  5:44:46 PM 
931 Coordination or Mere Registration? 
 937 
stifle the speech of those who would prefer to remain anonymous.31 
Second, such systems may impose objective burdens on citizens who 
would refuse to register because of religious or patriotic views.32 
Third, such systems effectively ban spontaneous speech.33 
Beyond its concern over the uneven balance against free speech, 
the Court also looked at the tailoring of the ordinance to the Village 
of Stratton’s interests. Even if the Village’s interests in preventing 
crime and protecting the privacy of residents were significant, the 
Court found that the ordinance was overly intrusive as well as 
underinclusive. The ordinance was overly intrusive because residents 
could simply refuse to engage with any canvassers without the need 
for any permit system at all.34 The ordinance was underinclusive 
because “[t]he annoyance caused by an uninvited knock on the front 
door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit.”35 
C. Reconciling Watchtower Bible with the Court’s                 
Permitting Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Watchtower Bible legitimately 
confuses many onlookers. Since the Court failed to articulate a clear 
rationale for its decision—giving only a laundry list of reasons—later 
onlookers have puzzled over how and when to apply the Watchtower 
Bible analysis to future cases. Given the Court’s lack of clarity as to 
its standard of review, or even its rationale, it is unclear how 
Watchtower Bible should be reconciled with the rest of the Court’s 
permitting jurisprudence. Even so, a strong argument can be made 
that the Court has always had a balancing test for permitting 
schemes,36 and that Watchtower Bible was consistent with the Court’s 
general approach.  
1. The various balancing tests in the Court’s permitting jurisprudence 
As a threshold matter, the Court weighs the value of the 
permitting scheme in light of the presumption against prior 
 
 31. Id. at 166–67 (explaining that circulators do not forfeit their anonymity interests 
simply because they reveal their physical presence). 
 32. Id. at 167. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 168. 
 35. Id. at 168–69. 
 36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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restraints. This presumption is based on the notion that a speaker has 
a general right of anonymity and spontaneity.37 However, that 
presumption may be rebutted if the government has (1) a significant 
interest behind a law that (2) is content-neutral, (3) narrowly 
tailored, and (4) leaves ample alternative channels of communication.  
Each of these four steps has a balancing test. First, while the 
government may state that it has an interest in the safety and 
convenience of the public, the Court will examine and weigh the 
validity and relative strength of this interest against the 
countervailing First Amendment interests of the intended speakers.38 
Second, even if the law is facially content-neutral, the Court will 
examine and weigh the relative strength of the objective factors 
guiding the discretion of permit administrators against any subjective 
factors that may otherwise persuade administrators.39 Third, the 
Court will evaluate the relative effectiveness and reasonable fit of the 
law to the stated interest to make sure that the right balance is struck 
between the constitutional rights of the public and important 
governmental interests.40 Fourth, the Court will evaluate the relative 
restrictiveness of the law and the availability of alternative means of 
 
 37. Judge Easterbrook noted that “[f]our decisions of the Supreme Court hold or 
strongly imply that the ability to speak anonymously—and thus with less concern for 
repercussions—is part of the ‘freedom of speech’ protected by the first amendment against 
governmental interference.” Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 2004). Other courts 
have emphasized that there is a “strong interest in protecting the opportunity for spontaneous 
expression in public fora with respect to individuals or small groups,” but that it is “[l]ess 
conclusively decided . . . whether this First Amendment interest in spontaneous expression is 
similarly strong with respect to large groups or mass conduct.” Santa Monica Food Not 
Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 38. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793 (1989) (“Any governmental 
attempt to serve purely esthetic goals by imposing subjective standards of acceptable sound mix 
on performers would raise serious First Amendment concerns, but this case provides us with no 
opportunity to address those questions.”). 
 39. See id. at 794 (“Since respondent does not claim that city officials enjoy unguided 
discretion to deny the right to speak altogether, it is open to question whether respondent’s 
claim falls within the narrow class of permissible facial challenges to allegedly unconstrained 
grants of regulatory authority.”). 
 40. Id. at 799 (“[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . 
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.’” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)) 
(ellipsis in original)). “The narrow tailoring requirement has been categorized as a specialized 
instance of the more general classification of balancing tests . . . .” Marc E. Isserles, 
Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. 
REV. 359, 447 (1998). 
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communication to make sure that governmental interests do not 
entirely outweigh constitutional rights to expression.41 
2. How does Watchtower Bible fit in the time, place, and manner test? 
The Court’s approach in Watchtower Bible seems to most affect 
the first consideration of the time, place, and manner test—namely, 
weighing the importance of the governmental interest, which is 
almost always “safety, order, and convenience.” The governmental 
interest in safety, order, and convenience only makes sense when the 
government needs to coordinate large groups; otherwise, the permit 
system looks like a bare registration system.42 The government 
cannot have a legitimate interest in merely knowing who plans to 
speak without some legitimate coordination goal. Thus, if the 
government sought to implement a registration system like the one 
invalidated in Watchtower Bible, it would seem that the government 
would fail the first prong of the time, place, and manner test. 
Alternatively, Watchtower Bible might fit under the second 
consideration, weighing the reasonability of the tailoring employed 
to advance the legitimate governmental interest. The Court might 
allow the government to legitimately claim an interest in safety, 
order, and convenience, but closely examine whether the regulation 
itself substantially advances that interest. If the government failed to 
demonstrate a valid coordination interest, then perhaps the Court 
would find that the interest in safety, order, and convenience was not 
substantially advanced. Thus, under this approach, the stated 
governmental interest in safety, order, and convenience is 
presumptively accepted unless it becomes apparent that the 
 
 41. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In the 
‘ample alternatives’ context, the Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment 
requires only that the government refrain from denying a “reasonable opportunity” for 
communication. . . . We recognize that our decision takes into account a balance of the 
competing considerations of expression and order. But we do not think the Constitution 
requires otherwise.” (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 
(1986))). 
 42. Kellum, supra note 8, at 406–07 (“One of the most frequent justifications for the 
use of a prior restraint is the preservation of public safety and order. This oft-cited purpose of 
safety and order only gains practical legitimacy, however, if the ordinance in question seeks to 
regulate large group activities, such as parades and rallies. Courts entertaining this issue 
routinely hold that a permit requirement imposed on individual or small group speech to be 
overly burdensome.”) (internal citations omitted); see infra note 94. 
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regulation is not narrowly tailored to substantially advance that 
interest. 
Whether Watchtower Bible affects the inquiry into the 
governmental interest itself or merely the tailoring of that interest, it 
seems clear that Watchtower Bible does not fundamentally change the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Instead, Watchtower Bible merely seems to 
add some additional factors into the existing balancing tests. Under 
this analysis, while the test in Watchtower Bible was the same as prior 
cases, the result arguably came out differently because the permitting 
system at issue was essentially a bare registration system. 
3. The scrutiny of bare registration systems 
Does a bare registration system result in heightened scrutiny? 
The Court in Watchtower Bible failed to articulate its standard of 
review, instead stating: “We find it unnecessary, however, to resolve 
that dispute [i.e., which standard of review to employ] because the 
breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of the 
regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding 
it.”43 At least one Justice thought the Court had applied a 
heightened scrutiny.44 Other Justices thought the Court had applied 
intermediate scrutiny.45 It is hard to tell exactly what the Court did, 
except for its unambiguous invalidation of the ordinance.46 Some 
lower courts have explicitly rejected the application of strict scrutiny 
 
 43. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
164 (2002). 
 44. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court suggests that Stratton’s regulation 
of speech warrants greater scrutiny. But it would be puzzling if regulations of speech taking 
place on another citizen’s private property warranted greater scrutiny than regulations of speech 
taking place in public forums.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 45. See id. at 170 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In the intermediate scrutiny context, the 
Court ordinarily does not supply reasons the legislative body has not given.”). Some later 
courts of appeals have agreed. See, e.g., Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 334 
(6th Cir. 2009). 
 46. On the one hand, there seems to be some support for the argument that the Court 
used heightened scrutiny. The Court stated that despite its “recognition of [the Village of 
Stratton’s] interests as legitimate, [its] precedent is clear that there must be a balance between 
these interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.” Watchtower Bible, 
536 U.S. at 163. One could take this as recognition that the governmental interest would 
ordinarily be sufficient under intermediate scrutiny but was insufficient under heightened 
scrutiny. However, the Court could be understood to have said that the articulated 
governmental interest would ordinarily suffice but fails when submitted to its intermediate 
scrutiny balancing test.  
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for these types of cases.47 Whether the Court submitted the permit 
regulation in Watchtower Bible to strict scrutiny or intermediate 
scrutiny, any permit system that is merely a registration system will 
likely fail the standard set in Watchtower Bible.48 
III. BERGER V. CITY OF SEATTLE 
In 2002—the same year the Supreme Court decided Watchtower 
Bible—the City of Seattle implemented a permitting system for street 
performers in a City-owned public park and entertainment complex 
known as the Seattle Center. The permit system was challenged by 
one of the street performers affected, but was upheld in 2008 by a 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit.49 However, the Ninth Circuit 
subsequently reviewed the earlier decision en banc and changed 
course by invalidating the permitting system.50 
A. Facts 
The Seattle Center park covers eighty acres and is home to the 
Space Needle and various museums, sports arenas, theatres, and even 
 
 47. Goldhamer v. Nagode, 611 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Because Ladue 
and Watchtower Bible are very fact-specific, we do not believe that a mandate to strictly 
scrutinize laws that ‘have a broad impact’ on First Amendment rights can be drawn from these 
decisions.”). 
 48. Some judges and commentators have argued that Watchtower Bible fundamentally 
turned on the fact that the government had sought to regulate speech in essentially private 
forums, namely private residences. Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 635 F. Supp. 2d 829, 841 
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Watchtower . . . dealt with restraints on door-to-door canvassers who go 
onto private residential property—a circumstance wholly different from the establishment of 
reasonable and narrow constraints on the use of public property.”); Brad D. Bailey, 
Solicitations After Watchtower: Brother Do You Want a Tract?, COLO. LAW., Dec. 31, 2002, at 
66 (“It may initially appear that the Court in Watchtower is throwing out a content-neutral 
regulation when it applies to religious speech, political speech, and the distribution of 
handbills. However, the Court actually is telling municipalities that they have no business 
preventing speech from occurring between private citizens.”). The implication of this 
argument is that Watchtower Bible would not apply if the government implements a permit 
system in strictly public forums. This argument may have some appeal. After all, previous cases 
upholding permit schemes involved public forums. However, reducing Watchtower Bible to 
merely a case invalidating a private forum permit scheme seems overly simplistic. See Riel v. 
City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 754 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he decision in Watchtower was not 
based on whether the law applied to public or private property. Rather, the Supreme Court 
struck down the ordinance because, although the governmental interests involved were 
important, the ordinance was not likely to advance those interests.”). 
 49. Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger I), 512 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 50. Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger II), 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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a performance hall.51 Although it is essentially only a public city park, 
it attracts over ten million visitors a year.52 The park has become an 
iconic place for the city ever since it was originally developed as the 
location for the 1962 World’s Fair.53 
Besides the large crowds visiting the Seattle Center each day, 
there are also a handful of street performers who regularly use the 
park to ply their trade.54 The Berger plaintiff, “Magic Mike” Berger, 
is a balloon sculptor who performed in the park.55 Berger had 
performed in the Seattle Center since the 1980s, making balloon 
creatures and talking to his audience about the importance of 
reading books.56 However, Berger had also regularly been at the 
epicenter of various problems in the park. Other performers had 
complained to the park administrators about him in connection with 
confrontations over who could perform in which parts of the park.57 
Park visitors had also lodged complaints against Berger for being 
overly aggressive in seeking donations.58  
In response to these complaints, the Seattle Center, under the 
authority of the City, promulgated several ordinances.59 Rule F.1 
required “street performers” to obtain a permit before performing at 
the Center and to wear a badge displaying the permit while 
performing.60 The City defined “street performer” as “a member of 
the general public who engages in any performing art or the playing 
of any musical instrument, singing or vocalizing, with or without 
musical accompaniment, and whose performance is not an official 
part of an event sponsored by the Seattle Center or . . . [its] 
licensee.”61 Rule F.2 set forth the terms and conditions of the street 
performer permit.62 Rule F.3.a barred street performers from 
 
 51. Id. at 1035. 
 52. Id. at 1060 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1088 (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mentioning that 
there are only about “five to eight performers who typically perform on the Seattle Center 
grounds at peak times”). 
 55. Id. at 1034–35 (majority opinion). 
 56. Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger I), 512 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 57. See Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1049, 1060. 
 58. Berger I, 512 F.3d at 588. 
 59. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1035 n.1. 
 60. Id. at 1036–37.  
 61. Id. at 1036.  
 62. Id. at 1037. 
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“actively solicit[ing] donations.”63 Rule F.5 limited street performers 
to sixteen designated locations.64 Rule G.4 prohibited all Seattle 
Center visitors, not just street performers, from engaging in speech 
activities within thirty feet of a “captive audience.”65 Rule C.5 
defined “captive audience” as  
any person or group of persons: 1) waiting in line to obtain tickets 
or food or other goods or services, or to attend any Seattle Center 
event; 2) attending or being in an audience at any Seattle Center 
event; or 3) seated in any seating location where food or beverages 
are consumed.66 
Berger sued the City of Seattle on the grounds that these rules 
violated his First Amendment rights. The district court agreed, 
granting summary judgment to Berger and concluding that the 
ordinances facially violated the First Amendment.67 The City 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit to reverse the order of summary 
judgment. 
B. The Panel’s Opinion 
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court, and not only concluded that the Seattle Center rules did not 
facially violate the First Amendment, but also that the rules did not 
violate the First Amendment as applied to Berger’s factual 
situation.68  
At the outset of the majority opinion, authored by Judge 
O’Scannlain, the court recognized that the Seattle Center was a 
“traditional public forum.”69 The government’s right to limit 
expressive activity in a location so designated is “sharply 
circumscribed.”70 However, even though the City’s right to regulate 
and restrict expressive activities in the Seattle Center were 
circumscribed, the court recognized that the City had the right to 
 
 63. Id. at 1035 (alteration in original). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1034. 
 68. See Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger I), 512 F.3d 582, 588–601 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 69. Id. at 588 (“Expressive activity must be particularly protected in a traditional public 
forum, such as the Seattle Center.”). 
 70. Id. at 589 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
46 (1983)). 
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enact reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Under that 
framework, the court evaluated whether the contested rules were 
content neutral, whether the rules were narrowly tailored to promote 
a significant governmental interest, and whether the rules provided 
for ample alternative means for communication.71 The court 
ultimately found that all the contested rules were valid time, place, 
and manner restrictions.72 
The panel majority thought the rules were content neutral 
because they served purposes unrelated to the content of expression, 
“even if it ha[d] an incidental effect on some speakers or messages 
but not others.”73 The permitting requirement did not give the 
Seattle Center Director undue discretion because “[w]hile the 
Director may terminate or revoke a permit, even that decision 
depends upon the satisfaction of objective criteria or requires 7-day 
notice.”74 There was no evidence of any censorship. In fact, the court 
noted that the “Director has granted permits even to street 
performers with a history of complaints against them, such as 
Berger.”75  
Judge O’Scannlain thought the City had a significant interest in 
protecting the “safety and convenience” of persons using a public 
forum.76 Further, he pointed to the number of complaints regarding 
street performers. “[B]efore the performer rules went into effect . . . 
there were approximately 3 or 4 complaints by performers against 
other performers per week,” usually involving conflicts over who 
could perform in which places.77 There were also general complaints 
by other tenants of the Seattle Center about performers blocking 
access or making noise.78 Based on these facts, the panel majority 
determined that the City had a substantial interest in creating the 
performer permitting rules.79 
As to the claim of overbreadth, the majority defended the City 
rules. Even though the permitting rules applied to all street 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 607. 
 73. Id. at 592 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 74. Id. at 596. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 592. 
 77. Id. (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
650 (1981)) (ellipsis in original). 
 78. Id. 
      79.   Id. 
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performers, and not just the ones who had been problematic, the 
majority thought that the rules were appropriate because the City 
did not have to wait for bigger problems to arise before acting.80 
Furthermore, the City would not have been able to single-out 
individual performers to take part in the permitting requirement 
because it would have destroyed the content-neutrality.81  
The panel majority also rebuffed an allegation that the Seattle 
Center permitting requirement was underinclusive. Berger argued 
that the rule “targets street performers while allowing large crowds 
engaged in other types of expression to gather without a permit.”82 
The court explained, however, “narrow tailoring does not require 
comprehensiveness” and that “a legislature may deal with one part of 
a problem without addressing all of it.”83 The majority thought that 
since the “Director might have drafted a [more sweeping rule] . . . 
he was not required to impose further restrictions on expression.”84 
In the end, by a 2-1 decision, the panel majority held that the 
City’s permitting scheme was a valid time, place, and manner 
regulation designed to advance a substantial governmental interest.  
C. En Banc Opinion 
In the wake of the decision by the three-judge panel, the Ninth 
Circuit decided to hear the case again, en banc. In contrast to the 
earlier decision, the en banc court found that nearly all of the 
disputed ordinances facially violated the First Amendment.85 In 
another twist, Judge Berzon, the lone dissenter in the panel opinion, 
wrote the majority en banc opinion. 
1. Majority opinion 
The majority staked out several key principles at the outset of its 
opinion. First, “[t]he protections afforded by the First Amendment 
are nowhere stronger than in streets and parks.”86 The government 
 
 80. Id. at 593. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 595. 
 83. Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975)). 
 84. Id. at 596. 
 85. Berger v. City of Seattle (Berger II), 569 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc). 
 86. Id. at 1035–36 (footnotes omitted). 
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bears the burden of showing that its regulations on expressive 
activity meet all three elements of the time, place, and manner test. 
The majority held that the government failed to meet this burden.87 
The majority explained that “[a] permitting requirement is a 
prior restraint on speech and therefore bears a ‘heavy presumption’ 
against its constitutionality.”88 This type of prior restraint is 
presumptively invalid because of “the significant burden” it places on 
free speech, especially procedural and temporal hurdles.89 The 
Supreme Court has “consistently struck down permitting systems 
that apply to individual speakers—as opposed to large groups—in the 
one context in which they have been put in place with some 
regularity: solicitation of private homes.”90  
The dissent challenged the majority’s application of cases like 
Watchtower Bible and Cantwell on the ground that they were based 
on wholly different situations than the facts presented in Berger.91 
However, the majority explained that (1) performance art, like door-
to-door canvassing, shares a historical importance in the 
dissemination of ideas; (2) the Seattle Center permitting scheme 
inhibits performers’ ability to engage in spontaneous speech; (3) 
performers do not wish to forfeit their anonymity any more than 
canvassers of unpopular ideas; (4) these permitting rules applied 
whether or not performers solicited funds; and (5) these rules 
applied to individual performers who “communicate their message to 
groups as small as two or three others.”92 Therefore, if the present 
permitting scheme were sufficiently analogous to the invalidated 
permit scheme in Watchtower Bible, then it too would also be 
invalidated. 
Even though the majority found adequate similarities between 
the present facts and cases such as Watchtower Bible, the majority 
acknowledged that “the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
validity of single-speaker permitting requirements for speech in a 
public forum.”93 Even so, the majority declared, “we and almost 
 
 87.  Id. at 1035. 
 88. Id. at 1037 (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 1037–38. 
 90. Id. at 1038. 
 91. Id. at 1071–72 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 1038–39 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 93. Id. at 1039. 
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every other circuit to have considered the issue have refused to 
uphold registration requirements that apply to individual speakers or 
small groups in a public forum.”94 Instead, permitting rules are only 
appropriate when the government has an interest in coordinating 
large crowds.95 
In this case, the court determined that the “Center’s permitting 
requirement applies to individual speakers who wish to express 
themselves in a public forum . . . [and] is not limited to only those 
performers who seek to attract (or who do, in fact, attract) a crowd 
of a sufficiently large size.”96 The majority declared, “neither [the 
Ninth Circuit], the Supreme Court, nor most other circuit courts 
have ever upheld such a requirement.”97 Even so, the majority was 
willing to fully analyze the Seattle Center’s permitting requirement 
under the time, place, and manner test. 
Although the majority found the City’s stated interest in 
“protecting the safety and convenience of park-goers” generally 
appropriate, the court found the rule not narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.98 One of the major problems was that the 
permitting requirements did not substantially advance the stated 
governmental interest. The court saw “no reason [why] two street 
 
 94. Id.; see, e.g., Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica 450 F.3d 
1022, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing how a significant governmental interest for purposes 
of a prior restraint only arises when “large groups of people travel together on streets and 
sidewalks”); Cox v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing how 
application of a permitting requirement “to groups as small as two or three renders it 
constitutionally infirm”); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 
418 F.3d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 2005) (striking a permitting system that could apply to groups as 
small as “two or more persons”); Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 
permitting scheme as it presently exists is invalid with respect to individuals.”); Burk v. 
Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (striking an ordinance as 
overly broad in part because “it applies to small intimate groups that do not create a legitimate 
threat to the County’s interests”); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 
1387, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating permit scheme because it could possibly apply to 
individuals and groups as small as two); see also Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1524 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (describing, as dicta, that an ordinance as applied to groups as small as ten is not 
narrowly tailored); Diener v. Reed, 232 F. Supp. 2d 362, 386–88 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 77 
F. App’x. 601, 602, 605 (3d Cir. 2003) (nonprecedential) (striking an ordinance that would 
require even a single individual, regardless of the circumstances). But see Hobbs v. County of 
Westchester, 397 F.3d 133, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding single-speaker permitting 
requirement only if the performer planned to use “props and/or equipment”). 
 95. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1039. 
 96. Id. at 1040. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1041. 
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performers with permits would be less likely to engage in a territorial 
dispute than two street performers without permits.”99 After all, 
there was little, if any, process to screen out hostile performers 
because there was “no limit on the number of permits that may be 
issued” and the City did “not assign particular performers to specific 
times or locations.”100 In other words, the permitting requirement 
did not materially advance any conflict-reducing interests because 
even hostile performers could get permits. And it did not advance 
any coordination interests because the City had “no idea when or 
where a street performer intend[ed] to perform over the course of a 
permit year or how long any given performance [would] last.”101 
Instead of imposing a prior restraint on communication, the 
court asserted that the City could have achieved “its purported 
goal . . . by punishing only actual wrongdoers.”102 The City argued 
that it needed to have the street performers’ personal information in 
order to better enforce the Seattle Center rules. However, the 
majority found this argument unpersuasive. First, the court saw it as 
an impermissible prior restraint to require potential speakers to 
register with the government.103 Second, the court saw no practical 
impediment for Center employees to simply ask offending 
performers to identify themselves.104 Finally, the court noted that the 
City had no real need for the registration system in the first place 
because it likely already knew the identities of the small number of 
street performers who regularly visited the park.105 
2. Kozinski’s dissenting opinion 
Chief Judge Kozinski, joined by Judges Gould and Tallman, 
dissented from the court’s en banc decision. The dissenters marveled 
at the Seattle Center’s “dizzying array” of attractions and 
determined that “[o]perating an enterprise of this magnitude and 
complexity . . . calls for some basic rules, to ensure the safety and 
convenience of the tens of thousands of people who visit the Center 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1042. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1044. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1044–45. 
 105. Id. at 1045. 
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on an average day.”106 The dissent explained that the Center had 
received numerous complaints regarding street performers and 
enacted the disputed rules in response. These rules, the dissent 
contended, worked as intended, “bringing peace and order to what 
had been a chaotic and disruptive process.”107  
Although the dissent recognized that the Seattle Center is 
fundamentally a public park, it also saw the close connection 
between public parks and the governmental unit that owns the land. 
The dissenters highlighted the City’s legitimate, possibly even vital, 
interest in “maintaining the character of the multi-use facility that is 
the crown jewel of its civic enterprise.”108 In particular, the dissent 
noted that the City had an interest in protecting visitors from “overly 
aggressive street performers bent on increasing their own visibility 
and income by bullying those around them.”109 The expressive 
interests of street performers had to be balanced with the substantial 
interest of the City in ensuring the safety and convenience of park 
visitors. 
The dissent’s bottom line was that by “focusing on the largely 
imaginary First Amendment injuries which might be suffered by 
largely imaginary people,” the majority “impair[s] the First 
Amendment rights of the millions of actual people who come to the 
Seattle Center to see, to hear, to learn, to enjoy, without being 
subjected to the stress of dealing with overly-aggressive street 
performers who shout obscenities and send young children off 
crying.”110 Accordingly, the dissent thought this was a case where 
“the best thing judges can do is to butt out.”111 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SINGLE-SPEAKER               
PERMITTING SCHEMES 
As demonstrated by the sharp split in the Ninth Circuit on the 
applicability, meaning, and scope of key Supreme Court cases, the 
legal issues in Berger are quite controversial. Even so, the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, correctly held that the Seattle Center 
 
 106. Id. at 1060 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 1061. 
 108. Id. at 1064. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1073–74. 
 111. Id. at 1074. 
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permitting scheme was not an appropriate time, place, and manner 
restriction. In correctly invalidating the Seattle Center ordinance, the 
majority accurately understood and applied the Court’s permitting 
jurisprudence, especially regarding the threshold presumptions and 
the narrow tailoring of the ordinance.  
A. The Majority’s Analysis of the Threshold Presumptions 
The majority en banc decision correctly understood and applied 
the Supreme Court’s permitting jurisprudence. It understood that 
the Seattle Center ordinance violated the threshold presumptions 
behind the First Amendment by implementing a single-speaker 
permitting scheme in a traditional public forum. The majority 
concluded that this scheme was essentially a bare registration system 
that improperly took away speakers’ anonymity and spontaneity, and 
was thus incompatible with the First Amendment’s presumption 
against prior restraints. The majority also persuasively argued that 
this type of ordinance was similar enough to the scheme in 
Watchtower Bible to warrant its invalidation on that ground alone.  
1. Threshold presumptions 
The majority correctly identified the fundamental rights and 
presumptions of the First Amendment. First, as a fundamental right, 
the protections of the First Amendment are at their apex in streets 
and public parks.112 Second, any prior restraint bears a “heavy 
presumption” against its validity.113 Considering these two principles 
together, the majority was required to place a heavy burden on the 
City of Seattle because the City had created a prior restraint in 
relation to speech in a public park. 
Beyond the general presumption against the validity of the 
Seattle Center permitting scheme, the majority correctly identified 
the presumption against single-speaker permitting. It acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, and that 
there is a split amidst the federal circuits.114 However, it also 
 
 112. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks 
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”). 
 113. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992). 
 114. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1039 (majority opinion). 
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identified solid legal support for the presumption against single-
speaker permitting. There are currently at least seven circuits that 
have directly criticized permit schemes on the basis of their 
applicability to small groups and single speakers.115 And, while there 
is at least one circuit that has allowed single-speaker permitting, it 
has done so only in limited circumstances, such as when the speaker 
plans to use amplification devices.116 
While the Ninth Circuit majority acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court had not directly confronted the issue of single-
speaker permitting in a public forum, it carefully examined the 
Court’s treatment of analogous cases. In particular, the majority 
examined various cases wherein the Court had struck down permit 
schemes that had been applied to individual solicitors attempting to 
visit private residences.117 The Ninth Circuit majority reasoned that 
these single-speaker permitting schemes would likely have been 
invalidated whether or not they had involved public or private 
property. Specifically, the court thought that “such [a permit 
scheme] would be at least as constitutionally suspect when applied to 
speech in a public park, where a speaker’s First Amendment 
protections reach their zenith, than when applied to speech on a 
citizen’s doorstep, where substantial privacy interests exist.”118 
The Ninth Circuit majority implicitly discovered that the 
fundamental problem with single-speaker permit schemes is the 
unreasonable burden it imposes on freedom of speech. The 
fundamental presumption against prior restraints could easily be 
rephrased as a presumption against speech registration. The majority 
clearly understood that registration impinged upon the speaker’s 
 
 115. See supra note 94. 
 116. See supra note 94. 
 117. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1038 (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently struck down 
permitting systems that apply to individual speakers-as opposed to large groups-in the one 
context in which they have been put in place with some regularity: solicitation of private 
homes.” (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 166–67 (2002); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638–
39 (1980) (striking down a solicitation permit requirement); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 301, 306–07 (1940) (striking down a license requirement as applied to Jehovah’s 
Witnesses “going singly from house to house” for the purpose of religious solicitation); 
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163–64 (1939) (striking down a permitting scheme 
covering all forms of solicitation))). 
 118. Id. at 1039 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483–84 (1988)). 
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general right to be anonymous and spontaneous119—the limitation of 
which is the general problem associated with prior restraints.120 
Further, the majority correctly perceived that the government’s 
interest in large group coordination was essentially the only means of 
overcoming the presumption against registration systems.121 
2. Problems with a bare registration system 
The majority correctly understood that registration itself is not 
the problem. Indeed, registration is necessarily a part of permissible 
coordination systems because the permit applicant must divulge his 
or her identity in order to obtain a permit. However, in the 
coordination context, the concerns about registration—loss of 
anonymity and spontaneity—are lessened by the fact that only one or 
two persons will have to divulge their identity (instead of each and 
every person attending an event).122 Furthermore, the concern over 
spontaneity is lessened in the large group context because such 
groups usually require a few days or weeks of preparation anyway 
before having a demonstration.123 When these factors are taken into 
 
 119. Id. at 1038 n.5 (“[T]he Seattle Center’s permitting requirement . . . significantly 
inhibits spontaneous speech. . . . [T]here is no reason to believe that street performers are less 
interested in maintaining their anonymity from the government than door-to-door canvassers 
or other purveyors of potentially unpopular ideas.”). 
 120. Kellum describes that permit schemes “effectively eliminate spontaneous expression” 
and “[w]hen an individual is required to divulge their identity just to secure permission to 
speak, this is a compulsion that ‘necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity.’” Kellum, 
supra note 8, at 384, 412 (quoting Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 166); see also Santa Monica 
Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[There is 
a] strong interest in protecting the opportunity for spontaneous expression in public fora with 
respect to individuals or small groups . . . .”); Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante opinion) (“Four decisions of the Supreme Court hold or 
strongly imply that the ability to speak anonymously—and thus with less concern for 
repercussions—is part of the ‘freedom of speech’ protected by the first amendment against 
governmental interference.”). 
 121. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1040 n.7 (“[A]dvance registration permits are only 
appropriate for larger crowds than any street performer at the Seattle Center is likely to draw at 
one time.” (citing Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010, 
1033 (9th Cir. 2008), amended by 574 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 122. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1046 
(9th Cir. 2006) (“[It is] [l]ess conclusively decided . . . whether this First Amendment interest 
in spontaneous expression is similarly strong with respect to large groups or mass conduct.”).  
 123. Kellum, supra note 8, at 407 (“No doubt, individuals and small groups are 
particularly vulnerable to restrictions on spontaneous speech. Large groups are not as 
susceptible because it takes more time for them to disseminate information about an event, 
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consideration, the governmental interest in coordinating the time, 
place, and manner of large groups trumps the minor infringement on 
the anonymity and spontaneity of the group speech. 
However, mere registration is a much greater problem. In the 
absence of large group coordination, the governmental interest in 
public safety, order, and convenience starts to look much less 
significant. And when the permit system reaches all the way down to 
the single speaker, then the government’s interest in coordination 
seems minor to non-existent. Without the large group coordination, 
all that is left is the nasty registration component.124 
A mere registration system is especially pernicious in the small 
group or single speaker context. In such a context, the core 
registration concerns about anonymity and spontaneity are much 
greater.125 After all, the Court only begrudgingly allows registration 
in the large group coordination context because the governmental 
interest in coordination is much more significant and the deleterious 
effects of registration are mitigated. However, in the small group or 
single speaker context, many more people will have to identify 
themselves to the government before speaking, and spontaneous 
speech will be chilled. 
3. Application of the threshold presumptions 
In its application of the general presumptions to the Berger case, 
the Ninth Circuit came to the correct conclusion that the Seattle 
Center permit system was essentially a single-speaker registration 
system in a public forum.126 Obviously, the ordinance applied to 
individual street performers in a public forum.127 These performers 
were required to register with the City, disclose their identity, and 
 
assemble, and engage in public expression.” (citing Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 
1200, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 1994))). 
 124. Id. at 408 (“[A] permit requirement that covers individuals and small groups should 
be viewed as improper because movements of such small magnitude are not significant enough 
to justify prior permission.”). 
 125. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1037–38 (“The presumptive invalidity and offensiveness of 
advance notice and permitting requirements stem from the significant burden that they place 
on free speech. ‘Both the procedural hurdle of filling out and submitting a written application, 
and the temporal hurdle of waiting for the permit to be granted may discourage potential 
speakers.’ Registration requirements also dissuade potential speakers by eliminating the 
possibility of anonymous speech.” (quoting Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206)). 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 1036–37. 
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suspend their speech activities until the permit was granted.128 While 
it is true that the City claimed an interest in coordinating the 
competing uses of the Seattle Center,129 it is doubtful that the City 
had a legitimate interest in coordinating the activities of a handful of 
individuals. 
The majority correctly saw the City’s stated coordination interest 
as purely speculative. In effect, the permit scheme applied to 
individual street performers whether or not they intended, or ever 
actually succeeded, in attracting a large crowd.130 There was only a 
hypothetical governmental interest in large group coordination—in 
other words, it was only possibly true that some street performers 
might someday attract a large crowd. The majority correctly 
dismissed the City’s “someday” argument and thus wisely refused to 
defer to hypothetical coordination interests without a more 
substantial showing. 
This analysis is correct and seems capable of withstanding likely 
counterarguments. For example, one concern with the majority’s 
analysis might be that it fails to recognize both the difficulty of 
estimating the size of the crowd on any given day and the City’s 
legitimate interest in dealing with potential problems before they 
become overwhelming.131 While this is a valid concern, it does not 
adequately consider the burdens of proof placed upon the 
government. The general presumptions are all against the City when 
it intends to enact a prior restraint in a public forum,132 and the City 
likely bears an even higher burden when it seeks to coordinate the 
speech activities of individuals instead of large groups. 
To defer to the City in this case would turn the Court’s 
permitting jurisprudence on its head. The Court has been clear that 
 
 128. Id. at 1036 (“Rule F.1 requires all ‘street performers’ to obtain a permit from the 
Director prior to performing on the Center’s grounds.”). 
 129. Id. at 1040. 
 130. Id. at n.7 (“Although street performers do, of course, hope to draw crowds, this 
goal is of little moment to our analysis. The individual protestors in Rosen and Grossman also 
undoubtedly hoped to attract crowds of people eager to learn their views. But we have 
emphasized that advance registration permits are only appropriate for larger crowds than any 
street performer at the Seattle Center is likely to draw at one time.”). 
 131. Id. at 1067 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“The size of the crowd on any given day, at 
any particular hour, may be hard to predict, but it doesn’t matter, as long as the Center 
reasonably believes that on some days, at some hours, a sufficiently large crowd may gather to 
impair the efficient operation of the Center.”). 
 132. Id. at 1035–36 (majority opinion) (“The protections afforded by the First 
Amendment are nowhere stronger than in streets and parks.”) (footnote omitted). 
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public parks and streets are among the most protected places for 
speech and that the government may not impose a prior restraint on 
speech without a valid governmental interest. But who decides the 
validity of the governmental interest? Certainly not the government 
itself; otherwise the fox would be guarding the First Amendment 
hen house. If judges merely defer to the government, or just “butt 
out” altogether as the dissent suggested,133 then the government is 
essentially given a free pass to enact whatever type of regulation it 
likes. 
4. The applicability of Watchtower Bible 
Without a legitimate coordination interest, the Seattle Center 
ordinance was just a single-speaker registration system. The Ninth 
Circuit majority correctly saw a strong analogy to Watchtower Bible, 
a landmark case in which a local government had also implemented a 
single-speaker registration system. The dissent disagreed and thought 
that Watchtower Bible turned on the fact that the litigants were 
engaged in the dissemination of religious ideas through the historical 
practice of door-to-door canvassing.134 They saw Watchtower Bible as 
inapplicable to Berger because the street performers here were not 
disseminating ideas, like religious canvassers, but rather were 
entertainers aggressively plying their business to the public.135 
The majority thoughtfully responded to this criticism. First, it 
reasoned that “performance art, like door-to-door canvassing, has 
historically served an important role in the dissemination of ideas” 
and, quoting Judge Gould’s dissenting opinion, “[s]ome of our 
culture’s most valued written works originated as spoken 
performances.”136 But this was not the majority’s strongest 
argument. For one thing, the Watchtower Bible Court almost 
certainly did not hinge its decision on this point.137 More 
 
 133. Id. at 1074 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 1071. 
 135. Id. at 1072. 
 136. Id. at 1038–39 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 137. The Court in Watchtower Bible mentioned the historical nature of canvassing in its 
extended discussion about Court cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161–64 (2002). When the Court 
actually analyzed the registration scheme in that case it balanced the governmental interest 
against the objective burdens on potential speakers—i.e., anonymity and spontaneity. Id. at 
165–67. After its balancing test, it described how the registration system had also failed to 
substantially advance the governmental interest. Id. at 168. Thus, while the Court articulated 
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importantly, the Berger majority seems to easily equate street 
performers with the high art of yesteryear. While it is true that street 
performers are engaged in a form of performance art, it is a stretch to 
imagine that their craft has become as historically important as door-
to-door canvassing. Furthermore, the street performers in Berger do 
not appear to be primarily engaged in the dissemination of ideas; 
instead, they are primarily providing services in exchange for 
donations. 
In contrast to its somewhat weak argument about the historical 
importance of street performance in the dissemination of ideas, the 
majority correctly pointed to the Court’s substantial concern about 
the burdens of registration systems. The Watchtower Bible Court 
particularly emphasized that registration systems deprive individuals 
of their general right to anonymity and spontaneity.138 The Berger 
majority correctly reasoned that street performers have just as much 
right to anonymity and spontaneity as anyone else. Street performers 
are much like door-to-door canvassers; the fact that they interact 
with the public is insufficient to strip them of their right to 
anonymity.139 While it is true that canvassers are much more despised 
generally than street performers, and perhaps more deserving of 
anonymity,140 the Court did not make the right of anonymity 
conditional upon how much the public dislikes the type of 
speaker.141  
 
many reasons for its decision, it is unlikely that the historical nature of canvassing was the most 
important. 
 138. Id. at 166–67. 
 139. Id. at 167 (“The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not 
foreclose our consideration of the circulators’ interest in maintaining their anonymity.”). The 
Court further explained that “‘[t]he decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear 
of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to 
preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.’” Id. at 166 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–342 (1995)). 
 140. But see id. at 166 n.14 (“[T]he Jehovah’s Witnesses do not themselves object to a 
loss of anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis of overbreadth.”). 
 141. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (“Anonymity thereby provides a way for a writer who 
may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply 
because they do not like its proponent.”). In this case, however, it would seem likely that 
Berger would face a backlash from his poor behavior vis-à-vis other street performers and 
Seattle Center patrons. Although his identity was likely well known among other street 
performers and the Seattle Center management, he could have a valid interest in maintaining 
some measure of anonymity from the general public. However, whether or not Berger 
personally faced a loss of anonymity, the Seattle Center ordinance was vulnerable to an 
overbreadth analysis. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1041 (“[T]he Center’s permitting rule applies, on 
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One remaining question is whether the presumptions of 
anonymity and spontaneity apply to quasi-commercial activity, like 
that engaged in by the street performers in Berger. The Court in 
Watchtower Bible expressed in dicta that the Village of Stratton 
ordinance might have been upheld had it applied “only to 
commercial activities and the solicitation of funds.”142 This would 
have been appropriate because the Village had clearly expressed an 
interest in preventing fraudulent transactions.143 Seattle expressed no 
similar interest in preventing fraudulent transactions or in any other 
interest that depended on honest business practices. Even so, no one 
is seriously contending that these street performers would receive a 
lesser form of First Amendment protection merely because a part of 
their act includes a monetary donation. 
While the Ninth Circuit majority did apply Watchtower Bible to 
Berger, it did not entirely base its decision to invalidate the Seattle 
Center registration scheme on the application of Watchtower Bible. 
Even though the Seattle Center’s permit scheme failed the general 
presumption against prior restraint since it was a single-speaker 
registration system without a valid coordination interest, the majority 
appropriately found an alternative means of invalidation—namely, a 
lack of narrow tailoring. 
B. The Majority’s Narrow Tailoring Analysis 
Besides an interest in coordination, the City of Seattle asserted an 
interest in reducing both performer-on-performer and performer-on-
patron conflicts. The Ninth Circuit majority took a page from the 
Watchtower Bible playbook by acknowledging the City’s asserted 
interests as legitimate but then immediately criticizing the regulation 
as failing to substantially advance those legitimate interests.144 In 
 
its face, to an extraordinarily broad group of individuals, the vast majority of whom are not 
responsible for the ‘evil’ the City seeks to remedy.”). 
 142. Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 165. 
 143. See id. at 162–63, 165. 
 144. Compare id. at 164–65 (“The Village argues that three interests are served by its 
ordinance: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents’ 
privacy. We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are important 
interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation 
activity. We must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and 
whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental 
interests that the ordinance purports to serve.”), with Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1041 (“The City 
asserts that the permitting requirement promotes its interest in protecting the safety and 
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Berger, the majority correctly determined that the ordinance at issue, 
as in Watchtower Bible, did not substantially advance the 
governmental interests. Furthermore, even if the ordinance somehow 
advanced those governmental interests, the majority correctly 
invalidated it because it was poorly tailored and overly intrusive.145 
1. Advancement of governmental interests 
As described above, the Seattle Center ordinance did not 
significantly advance the governmental interest in coordinating 
multiple uses of the park.146 The City required individuals to obtain 
permits without any adequate basis that any one of these individuals 
would be able to attract a group of sufficient size147 to justify the 
strong presumption against mere registration systems. Furthermore, 
the permit did not specify when a performer would be at any 
particular location,148 so the government did not have any reasonable 
way of coordinating the use of the park. Even though there were 
limits on the number of performers that could be in different places, 
the City would still have had no idea when any particular performer 
would be in any given place. 
The Seattle Center ordinance also did not significantly advance 
Seattle’s interest in reducing conflicts between performers. The 
majority accurately articulated that there was no reason why “two 
street performers with permits would be less likely to engage in a 
territorial dispute than two street performers without permits.”149 
 
convenience of park-goers by reducing territorial disputes among performers, deterring 
harassment of audience members, and clarifying and coordinating potentially competing uses. . 
. . The City’s asserted reasons for enacting the permitting regulations are thus substantial 
governmental interests. Unlike the restrictions in the cases just cited, however, the Center’s 
permitting requirements do not promote those interests in any significant way.”) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 145. See Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1041–48. 
 146. Id. at 1042 (“[T]he permitting requirement, as currently designed, does not aid in 
coordinating multiple uses of the Center’s grounds.”). 
 147. Id. at 1040 (“The [permitting] requirement is not limited to only those performers 
who seek to attract (or who do, in fact, attract) a crowd of a sufficiently large size. . . . [T]he 
interests the City asserts . . . are no more, and perhaps less, substantial than those cited by the 
local governments in the door-to-door solicitation cases.”) (footnote omitted). 
 148. Id. at 1042 (“[T]he Rules place no limit on the number of permits that may be 
issued and do not assign particular performers to specific times or locations. As a result, the 
Center has no idea when or where a street performer intends to perform over the course of a 
permit year or how long any given performance will last.”). 
 149. Id. at 1041. 
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After all, the permit would not have reserved a specific time and 
place for a performer. This was significant because prior Court cases 
indicated a preference toward coordination based on specific times 
and places.150 Presumably, there would still have been the inevitable 
rush to secure particularly desirable locations with the resulting 
disputes between performers concerning who would have been able 
to stay. 
The ordinance also did not substantially advance Seattle’s interest 
in reducing conflicts between performers and patrons. The majority 
correctly reasoned that the permits were freely given without any 
kind of background check.151 Even though Berger was the person 
about whom the City had received the majority of complaints, it still 
gave him a permit. Berger’s possession of a permit did not prevent 
him from getting into trouble. After all, the licensing scheme would 
not have miraculously caused Berger to reform himself. 
In contrast, the dissent argued that the permit system did 
substantially advance the City’s interest. After the ordinance went 
into effect, the number of complaints went down, suggesting the law 
actually had advanced the City’s interest in reducing conflicts.152 One 
problem with this argument is that its conclusion is entirely 
speculative. Indeed, the number of complaints may have gone down 
for reasons unrelated to the regulation’s effectiveness. For instance, 
most of the previous complaints had involved Berger.153 His 
improved behavior after the imposition of the regulation may be 
more attributable to his efforts to win his lawsuit than to the efficacy 
of the regulation. Without a more convincing showing, these facts 
only indicate unproven correlation. 
However, this raises the question of how much proof the City 
would need to give under the majority’s analysis. Is it not enough 
 
 150. The majority pointed to two Supreme Court cases in particular, Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), and Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). Id. at 
1042–43 n.10 (“[I]t is the very fact that the permitting schemes in Cox and Poulos required 
applicants to specify the day and hour of their gathering that ensured that the restraints at issue 
did, in fact, promote the government’s legitimate interest in coordinating multiple uses of a 
public space. In other words, the permitting requirement in Cox and Poulos accomplished more 
than the mere identification of potential speakers.”). 
 151. Id. at 1041–42. 
 152. Id. at 1060–61 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 1046 n.15 (majority opinion) (“The City reports that, in the year prior to the 
introduction of the revised Rules, 70% of the performer-related complaints it received were 
either generated by or were in reference to ‘Magic Mike’ Berger.”). 
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that the City had a legitimate interest in reducing conflicts, and that 
after implementing the regulation, the interest appeared to have 
been met? It is a difficult question that the majority apparently did 
not resolve. Perhaps one way to answer the question, however, is to 
look at the burden of proof imposed on the City by creating a prior 
restraint in a public forum.154 It would seem reasonable that this 
heavier burden of proof would apply across the board, including as 
to whether the regulation had substantially advanced a legitimate 
governmental interest. However, even if it is conceded that the 
ordinance was somehow effective, there are still problems with how 
it was tailored. 
2. Poor tailoring 
The City worried that individual street performers might 
hypothetically attract a huge audience—thereby disrupting the crowd 
flow of the Seattle Center. However, the majority reasoned that 
“[u]nder the Rules, a group of as many as 99 people can gather 
without a permit to express their views, so long as they are not 
engaged in an artistic performance.”155 It would seem that the City 
cheerfully allowed groups as large as one-hundred to gather without 
a permit, but demanded a permit from each individual street 
performer even if that performer would only attract, at most, a few 
dozen people. 
There are two ways to look at the issue. First, the City may 
sincerely have worried about the size of crowds street performers 
normally attract. Presumably, street performers do not regularly 
attract crowds of more than fifty people. Under this approach, the 
rules were underinclusive because they would have allowed even 
larger groups, up to one-hundred people, to gather without a 
permit. Second, the City may have only been worried about crowds 
of one-hundred or more. In that case, the street performer ordinance 
would seem overly broad because it would have required street 
performers to obtain a permit even if they realistically would attract 
only a few dozen people. 
 
 154. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 155. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1043. 
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3. Overly intrusive 
Even if the City had a legitimate interest in, and was reasonably 
successful at, reducing conflicts among performers and between 
performers and patrons, the ordinance was also overly intrusive. The 
majority correctly noted that “even if the permitting requirement 
does deter and help to punish unwanted behavior, ‘there are easily 
available alternative modes of regulation’ that would have 
considerably less impact on speech than the single-speaker 
prospective registration system.”156 In other words, if the 
government wanted to reduce certain types of conflict, then it 
presumably could have drafted rules specifically addressing those 
problems. Consequently, the government should not create prior 
restraints on speech merely to deal with conduct that can be 
addressed without the prior restraint.157 
In this case, if the City’s goal was to reduce conflicts, it 
presumably could have drafted rules to deal with the problem 
directly rather than creating a single-speaker registration system. 
Even if permit holders engaged in fewer conflicts than non-permit 
holders, the permit system was overly intrusive because it was not 
necessary to reduce the conflicts. The majority correctly recognized 
that “[t]he City does not explain why this system would not function 
just as well if the penalty was the suspension of the performer’s 
future right to perform at the Center, rather than the suspension of 
his permit.”158 It appears that the City could punish the disorderly 
conduct of performer just as well without a permit system as with a 
permit system. Under these circumstances, the City imposed an 
overly intrusive and superfluous prior restraint. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, correctly invalidated the 
Seattle Center permitting scheme because the ordinance violated one 
of the core presumptions of the First Amendment. Specifically, the 
 
 156. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa 
Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1041 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 
147, 162 (1939) (invalidating a total ban on the distribution of all handbills that was aimed at 
reducing litter). The Schneider Court explained, “There are obvious methods of preventing 
littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the street.” 
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162. 
 157. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 158. Berger II, 569 F.3d at 1043 n.13. 
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court was correct in striking the law since the government may not 
impose a speech registration system—especially in a public park—
without a legitimate governmental interest. While it is true that the 
City claimed an interest in coordinating the competing uses of the 
Seattle Center, the City failed to demonstrate that it had a legitimate 
interest in coordinating the activities of a handful of individuals. 
While the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on this 
particular issue, a strong majority of circuits have invalidated permit 
schemes that apply solely to small groups or individual speakers. 
Additionally, because it was not narrowly tailored to substantially 
advance Seattle’s interest in coordinating competing uses of the park 
and reducing conflicts, the Ninth Circuit correctly invalidated the 
Seattle Center permit scheme as an alternative holding. There was no 
objective reason to believe street performers with permits would be 
less likely to engage in conflict than street performers without 
permits. However, even if the permit system had nominally advanced 
the City’s interests, the regulation was poorly tailored to fit the 
government’s interest in coordination. Moreover, the permit scheme 
was also overly intrusive considering that the City’s interest in 
reducing conflicts could have easily been achieved directly, without 
the use of a speech registration system. 
With this case, the Ninth Circuit joins the clear majority of 
circuits to underscore the limits of permitting schemes. 
Municipalities around the country are attempting to implement 
overly intrusive single-speaker permitting schemes, undermining the 
First Amendment rights of all Americans.159 This case highlights the 
fact that while many circuits have opposed these types of schemes, 
there is not universal consensus that these schemes should be 
unconstitutional, and there is no guarantee that the current circuit 
majority will continue.160 Should the Supreme Court choose to 
 
 159. See Kellum, supra note 8, at 384 (“[M]unicipalities are passing ordinances that 
require governmental approval for anyone who wants to use public streets and sidewalks for 
expressive purposes, whether it be large organizations, small groups, or even individuals. 
Because such schemes invoke advance notice, they effectively eliminate spontaneous 
expression. Moreover, many of these permit schemes even assess fees for the mere opportunity 
to engage in protected expression in a public forum, begging the question of whether free 
speech is actually free.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 160. For example, in 2008, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held the Seattle 
Center ordinance to be entirely constitutional despite clear precedent in the Ninth Circuit 
opposing single-speaker/small-group permitting. Even in the en banc review, the decision to 
strike the ordinance was strongly opposed by a vocal minority. 
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address the issue of single-speaker regulations, the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Berger may provide a foundation in support of limiting 
the constitutionality of permitting schemes to legitimate large group 
coordination and not merely to individual or small group 
registration. 
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